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SUPER-MAJORITIES AND EQUAL PROTECTION
In Lance v. Board of Education of County of Roane,' the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia rendered a novel interpretation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. At a special elec-
tion the Board of Education of Roane County, West Virgina submitted to
the voters of the County the question of issuing bonds for the purpose of
improving local educational facilities. At the same special election there
was submitted to the voters a proposal for the laying of additional tax
levies in excess of the regular authorized levy. The final tally of votes
revealed that 51.55%of the total votes cast favored the issuance of the
bonds and 51.51% of the total votes cast favored the additional levy.2
Under West Virginia law, a three-fifths majority was needed to support
the incurring of the bond indebtedness3 and a sixty percent vote was re-
quired in elections to authorize local tax levying bodies to make addi-
tional levies.4 Plaintiffs, who voted in favor of both propositions, brought
1 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969).
2 The facts are summarized from Lance v. Board of Education of County of Roane, 170
SXE.2d 783 (1969).
a W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 8 provides that: 'No county, city, school district, or municipal
corporation, except in cases where such corporations have already authorized their bonds to be
issued, shall hereafter be allowed to become indebted, in any manner, or for any purpose to an
amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate, exceeding five per centum on the
value of the taxable property therein to be ascertained by the last assessment for State and county
taxes, previous to the incurring of such indebedness; nor without, at the same time, providing
for the collection of a direct annual tax on all taxable property therein, in the ratio, as between
the several classes or types of such taxable property, specified in section one of this article,
separate and apart from and in addition to all other taxes for all other purposes, sufficient to
pay, annually, the interest on such debt, and the principal thereof, within, and not exceeding
thirty-four years. Such tax, in an amount sufficient to pay the interest and principal on bonds
issued by any school district not exceeding in the aggregate three per centum of such assessed
value, may be levied outside the limits fixed by section one of this article: Provided, that no
debt shall be contracted under this section, unless all questions connected with the same, shall
have been first submitted to a vote of the people, and have received three-fifths of all the votes
cast for and against the same." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-4 (Michie 1966) provides that:
"No debt shall be contracted or bonds issued under this article until all questions connected with
the same shall have been first submitted to a vote of the qualified electors of the political divi-
sion for which the bonds are to be issued, and shall have received three-fifths of all the votes
cast for and against the same." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-14 (Michie 1966) provides that:
"If three-fifths of all the votes cast for and against the proposition to incur debt and issue negoti-
able bonds shall be in favor of the same, the governing body of the political division shall, by
resolution, authorize the issuance of such bonds ......
4 W. VA. CONs'r. art. X, § 1 provides that: "Subject to the exceptions in this section con-
tained, taxation shall be equal and uniform through the State, and all property, both real and
personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law. No one
species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other
species of property of equal value; except that the aggregate of taxes assessd in any one year
upon personal property employed exclusively in agriculture, including horticulture and grazing,
products of agriculture as above defined, including live stock, while owned by the producer,
and money, notes, bonds, bills and accounts receivable, stocks and other similar intangible per-
sonal property shall not exceed fifty cents on each one hundred dollars of value thereon and
upon all property owned, used and occupied by the owner thereof exclusively for residential
purposes and upon farms occupied and cultivated by their owners or bona-fide tenants one dol-
lar, and upon all other property situated outside of municipalities, one dollar and fifty cents;
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suit for declaratory judgments ordering the local school board to author-
ize the laying of the additional tax levy and the issuance and sale of the
proposed bonds on the ground that the "super-majority" requirements in
the state constitution and statutes were invalid in that they denied to the
plaintiffs equal protection of the laws guaranteed to them by the fourteenth
amendment. They asserted that the effect of the super-majority vote re-
quirements was to unconstitutionally dilute the weight of an affirmative
vote when considered in relation to the weight of a negative vote. More
specifically, the plaintiffs contended that in the case of a three-fifths ma-
jority requirement the negative vote has one and one-half times the force
of an affirmative vote. The Circuit Court of Roane County directed that
the complaint be dismissed, this ruling was reversed by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia.5 Drawing from the rationale of re-
cent United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with the right to vote,
the court held that the requirements of super-majorities in the instances
before the court violated the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. The constitutional validity of West Virginia's interpretation
of the equal protection clause merits careful scrutiny since the require-
ment of super-majorities is commonplace in state and local governments
throughout the United States.6
The Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified
citizens to vote in both state and federal elections.7 In cases involving
attempts to deny or restrict the right of suffrage the Supreme Court has
consistently made it clear that an effective voting franchise is essential to
our system of ordered liberty. The Court has repeatedly recognized that
all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to vote and to
have their votes counted.' In United States v. Mosley' the Court main-
tained that it is "as equally unquestionable that the right to have one's
vote count is as open to protection ...as the right to put a ballot in a
and upon all other such property situated within municipalities, two dollars; and the legislature
shall further provide by general law, for increasing the maximum rates, authorized to be fixed,
by the different levying bodies upon all classes of property, by submitting the question to the
voters of the taxing units affected, but no increase shall be effective unless at least sixty percent
of the qualified voters shall favor such increase.. :' W. VA. CODM ANN. § 11-8-16 (Michie
1966) provides that: "A levying body may provide for an election to increase the levies, by enter-
ing on its records of proceedings an order....
The local levying body shall submit to the voters within their political subdivision, the
question of the additional levy at either a general or special election. If at least sixty percent
of the voters cast their ballots in favor of the additional levy, the local levying body may im-
pose the additional levy."
5 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969).
6 See, e.g., provisions cited notes 3 and 4 supra.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
8 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
9Id.
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box."' The right to vote can neither be denied outright 1 nor destroyed
by alteration of the ballots" nor diluted by stuffing the ballot box.'
3
Writing for the majority in United States v. Classic'4 Mr. Justice Stone
stated that "Obviously included within the right to choose, secured by the
Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within a state to cast their
ballots and have them counted . '. ."", Racially based gerrymandering
and the conduction of so called "white primaries," both of which result in
denying the right to vote to some citizens, have been held to be unconsti-
tutional.'" Most importantly to the Lance case, the Court has held that
the right to vote "can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the
weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the
free exercise of the franchise.'- 7
In Gray v. Sanders'8 the Court held that the Georgia county unit sys-
tem,' 9 which was applicable in statewide primary elections, was unconsti-
tutional since it resulted in a dilution of the weight of the votes of certain
Georgia voters merely because of where they resided. The Court noted
that the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments prohibited a state from
weighting or diluting votes on the basis of race or sex and concluded:
How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting power
of another person in a statewide election merely because he lives in a rural
area or because he lives in the smallest rural county? Once the geographi-
cal unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who
participate in the election are to have an equal vote-whatever their race,
whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and
wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is required
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The con-
cept of 'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class
of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications. The
idea that every voter is equal to every other voter in this State, when he
0.Id at 386.
11 Guinn & Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939).
12 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
13 Ex parie Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
'4 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
15 Id. at 315.
16 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927),
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953).
17 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
18 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
19 The Georgia county unit system was governed by a Georgia statute which was amended
in 1962 so as to allocate unit votes to counties as follows: Counties with populations not ex-
ceeding 15,000, two units; an additional unit for the next 5000 persons; an additional unit for
the next 10,000 persons; an additional unit for the next two brackets of 15,000; and there-
after, two more units for each increase of 30,000. All candidates for statewide office were
required to receive a majority of the county-unit votes to be entitled to nomination in the first
primary. GA. CODE ANN., §§ 34-3212, 34-3213 (1962).
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casts his ballot in favor of one of several competing candidates, underlies
many of our decisions.20
In Wesberry v. Sanders2' the Supreme Court held an apportionment
of congressional seats which "contracts the value of some votes and ex-
pands that of others" is unconstitutional. The Court found further that
it is the plain objective of the Constitution to make equal representation
for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal in any electoral system.
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in
the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens,
we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right
to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification
of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right.2
Wesberry establishes that the fundamental principle of representative gov-
ernment in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers
of people, regardless of race, sex, economic status, or place of residence
within a state.
In Reynolds v. Sims 23 the Court ascertained that there were no con-
stitutionally cognizable principles which would justify departure from the
basic standard of equality among voters in the apportionment of seats in
state legislatures and concluded that the seats in both houses of a bicameral
state legislature must, under the equal protection clause, be apportioned
substantially on a population basis.
In Carrington v. Rash24 the Supreme Court held that a state could not
fix its qualifications for voters so as to exclude certain otherwise qualified
voters because of the way they might vote in the election. This case in-
volved a provision in the Texas Constitution which prohibited any member
of the armed forces of the United States who moved his home to Texas
during the course of his military duties from voting in any election in Texas
as long as he was a member of the armed forces. The state of Texas
maintained that it was justified in prohibiting members of the armed
forces from voting in local elections. It was argued that a state has a le-
gitimate interest in prohibiting the right to vote when concentrated ballot-
ing by such transient groups as military personnel may result in a defeat
of the will of the majority of the native civilian community. The state
claimed that if military personnel be allowed to vote in local elections
bond issues may fall and property taxes may stagnate at low levels be-
cause military personnel are unwilling to invest in the future of the com-
munity. The Court noted that the theory underlying the argument was
that the Texas constitutional provision was necessary to prevent the danger
20 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963).
21 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
22 Id. at 17-18.
23 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
24 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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of a "takeover" of a small civilian community by the personnel of a
large nearby military base who might have no interest in the future of the
community. The Court upheld the right of a state to require that all peo-
ple, including military personnel, seeking the right to vote be bona fide
residents of the community. In striking down the Texas constitutional pro-
vision prohibiting military personnel from voting, the Supreme Court held
that if one is in fact a resident of the state, with the intention of making
the state his home indefinitely, he has a right to an equal opportunity for
political representation within the community. Justice Stewart writing
for the majority said:
"Fencing out" from the franchise a sector of the population because of the
way they may vote is constitutionally unpermissible. The exercise of
rights so vital to the maintainence of democratic institutions . . . cannot
constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of a
particular group of bona fide residents.2
More recent Supreme Court decisions2" have held that the equal pro-
tection clause reaches the exercise of state power, whether exercised by the
state or a political subdivision. Avery v. Midland County7 held that
citizens may not constitutionally be denied equal representation in politi-
cal subdivisions which also have broad policy-making functions. This
doctrine was further explained in Kramer v. Union Free School District
No. 15,28 a case which held that a New York statute limiting the fran-
chise in certain school districts to owners or lessees of taxable realty and
parents or guardians of children in public schools was in violation of the
equal protection clause and Cipriano v. City of Houma,29 a case holding a
Louisiana law which gave only "property taxpayers" the right to vote in
elections called to approve issuance of revenue bonds by municipal utilities
unconstitutional as denying equal protection. These cases maintain that
there must be a rational compelling state interest whenever the right to
vote is denied. According to Kramer v. Free Union School District No.
15, local policies of limiting the franchise in certain school districts to
owners or lessees of taxable realty and parents or guardians of children in
public schools are not necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
Under Cipriano v. City of Huoma, differences of opinion as to the advisa-
bility of the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility cannot jus-
tify excluding either property taxpayers or non-property taxpayers from a
bond election when both groups are substantially affected by the utility
operation. The opinions in both Kramer v. Union Free School District
25Id. at 93-4.
2 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Kramer v. Union Free School District
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
27390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968).
28395 U.S. 621 (1969).
29 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
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No. 15 and Cipriano v. City of Huoma standing for the proposition that
the "one person, one vote" principle has been stated in general terms
and without qualification under the equal protection clause are directly
in point with the Lance case. By requiring a super-majority to pass a bond
issue the state is, in effect, partially excluding citizens from exercising
their vote at the election because of their opinion as to the advisability of
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under Cipriano v. City of Huoma, dif-
ferences of opinion as to the advisability of the issuance of revenue bonds
is not a legitimate state interest which will justify restricting the franchise
when both groups are substantially affected by the object of the bonds.
The essential question raised in the Lance case is whether the Consti-
tution requires that in all public elections the outcome be determined by
the will of a simple majority. Historically, such a concept has not been
inherrent in the democratic process.,0  But the Constitution viewed as a
living foundation of government is not limited by historical shortcomings.
Indeed, a study of the Supreme Court decisions relating to the right to
vote in the last one hundred years is an apt example of this principle.
Consequently it becomes necessary to turn to the interpretations given
the equal protection clause by the Supreme Court in recent times.
Since the Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause re-
quires that once the voting franchise is granted to any group of citizens it
must be granted to all in that group equally, the West Virginia court
concluded that once a bond or tax levy issue is put before the voters,
each voter's vote must be counted equally with any other's vote. On the
surface such a deduction seems quite logical. However, one must not
overlook the context in which the Supreme Court laid down the rule that
the equal protection clause requires that once the right to vote is granted
it must be given to all who meet the necessary qualifications equally.
If the decisions are narrowly construed to apply only to the particular
facts before the Court, then the equal protection requirement that every-
one's vote be counted on an equal basis with any other's vote applies
only to elections in which the people are electing one to represent them
in a legislative assembly. All the Supreme Court decisions dealing with
"weighted votes" have been limited to such elections. In actions involving
the requirement of a super-majority there is no question of representa-
tion or apportionment. In Lance all the voters were members of the
same geographic unit; there was no question of the geographical or polit-
ical division of the state; there was no question of the sex of the voters,
their occupations, their income or their race; and there was no question
of representation or apportionment. The question immediately arises
whether the Court intended their holdings to apply to all state elections
of whatever nature or format. Does the rationale of the reapportion-
30 See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art I, §§ 5 and 7; and art. V.
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ment decisions naturally extend itself to a direct referendum? If it does,
how must such rationale be applied to referendum elections? The an-
swer to these questions lies in the analysis of the basic rationale of the vot-
ing decisions.
The dominant theme behind the recent Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with the right to vote has been the "one person, one vote" principle
of Gray v. Sanders."1 In Wesberry v. Sanders,32 the Court recognized
that while it may not be possible to draw congressional districts with
mathematical precision, the Constitution requires that "as nearly as practi-
cable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
another's. '2 3 In Reynolds v. Sims"4 the Court said:
... it is inconceivable that a state law to the effect that, in counting votes
for legislators, the vote of citizens in one part of the State would be multi-
plied by two, five, or 10, while the votes of persons in another area would
be counted only at face value, could be constitutionally sustainable. Of
course, the effect of state legislative districting schemes which give the
same number of representatives to unequal numbers of constituents is iden-
tical. Overweighting and overvaluation of the votes of those living there
has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the votes. The
resulting discrimination against the individual voters living in the dis-
favored areas is easily demonstrable mathematically. The right to vote is
simply not the same right to vote as that of those living in the favored
part of the State. Two, five or 10 of them must vote before the effect
of their voting is equivalent to that of their favored neighbor. Weighing
the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means, merely because
of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable.35
The end result of super-majority requirements in referendum elections is
to clearly weigh the votes against the proposition more heavily than the
votes in favor of the proposition. In the case of a sixty percent vote re-
quirement it takes three favorable votes to equal two unfavorable ones.
By simple mathematical reasoning each "no" vote is thus given one and
one-half times the weight of a "yes" vote.
The rationale of the super-majority requirements for certain elections
is based on the principle that in certain matters of great importance to the
political unit, a number of votes greater than a simple majority may be
required so that the stability of the political unit may be enhanced. It is
true that the more unanimity existing within the political unit the greater
the degree of stability that will exist therein. However, such a system
carried to its logical conclusion requires unaminous approval of all gov-
ernmental action. One can easily conclude that a particular matter is so
31 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
-32376 U.S. 1 (1964).
33 Id. at 7-8.
34 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
351d. at 562-63.
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wrought with peril that it cannot be safely entrusted to a simple majority
of the people and that it should therefore require a near unanimous vote
in order to impose it upon the minority.
If the election laws of a particular state should require that all repre-
sentatives to the state legislature be elected by no less than sixty percent of
the votes cast at the election, there would certainly be no doubt as to the
unconstitutionality of such statute. Such an arbitrary and discriminatory
requirement is completely foreign to the principles upon which our rep-
resentative government is based. There is, however, no difference between
a requirement for an official to receive a sixty percent vote and one for
a proposition submitted to the people to receive a sixty percent vote.
Similarly, if the legislature should require, because of its importance, a
proposition submitted to the voters must receive at least a ninety-nine per-
cent vote to become effective, there would be no hesitancy in determining
that the ninety-nine percent figure was arbitrary and discriminatory; yet
the figure of sixty percent is of no greater or lesser dignity than ninety-
nine percent.
There is no basis in logic why the right to vote should be less sacred
in a referendum involving questions of governmental policy than it is in
elections for representatives. One is no more of a necessary element of
the democratic process than the other. An equal voice in the election of
the legislature is of no greater importance to a citizen than the equality
of his vote in a referendum election which may result in substantial and
important changes in the status quo of the political community. There
can be no distinction between voting for competing candidates and voting
for propositions regarding the issuance of bonds or the laying of additional
tax levies. Under the equal protection clause it seems that each citizen
must have an equal voice in not only the establishment of governmental
policy by their representatives but also, in its approval when submitted to
them for ratification. The only standard which can be applied to effect
such equality is that of Gray v. Sanders 6-"one person, one vote."
The effect of the sixty percent requirement is similar to the effect of
the provision of the Texas Constitution which was struck down in Car-
rington v. Rash."T The majority of those voting at a bond or excess levy
election is effectively "fenced out" from their voting franchise because of
their views on the question in issue at the election. This, the Court has
held, the state cannot constitutionally accomplish whether in fixing the
qualifications of voters or in determining the results of the election.
Assuming the constitutional validity of the West Virginia Supreme
Court decision in the Lance case, what then will the ultimate effect of
such rationale be on state and local governments throughout the United
36 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
37 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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States. Again, limiting such a decision to its facts, the holding does not
go beyond direct referendum elections. But can such rationale logically
be limited only to its particular facts? If the requirement of super-major-
ities is allowed to continue in legislative assemblies, the problem which
the Lance case addresses itself to will persist. Instead of requiring a
super-majority of the citizens to pass upon an issue, the same result of
minority control can be achieved by requiring a super-majority of their
representatives to approve the issue when put before them. It thus seems
apparent that the holding must naturally extend itself to cover all gov-
ernmental elections whether they be by the people themselves or by their
representatives in a legislative assembly. If the decision is so extended,
the effectiveness of the machinery of government will be seriously ham-
pered. Effective democratic government depends upon striking a proper
balance between stability and equal representation. The rationale of the
Supreme Court in the voting cases when applied to the requirements of
super-majorities tends to destroy the effectiveness of a government by
tilting the scale too heavily in favor of equal representation at the expense
of stability.
Currently, the defendants are preparing a petition for Writ of Certio-
rari to the Supreme Court of the United States. If certiorari is granted
and if the Supreme Court follows the rationale of recent cases dealing
with the effective exercise of the right to vote, the Lance decision must
necessarily be affirmed. Such a result will certainly find the Court in the
midst of the "political thicket."
Thomas A. Frericks
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